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FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
TO EXPORT CONTROLS ON ENCRYPTION:
BERNSTEIN AND KARN
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government encourages the expansion of the
Internet and hails it as a revolution in the dissemination of
information and as an avenue for commerce.1 However, the
government uses its export control laws to restrict the expor-
tation and dissemination of encryption software, 2 a technol-
ogy which is crucial to the expansion of the Internet and to
the National Information Infrastructure, more popularly
known as Vice President Gore's Information Superhighway.
3
In defense of its export controls on encryption, the govern-
ment cites national security and law enforcement concerns.4
Software manufacturers complain that United States ex-
port controls prevent them from offering products that are
readily available abroad, putting American firms at a serious
competitive disadvantage with overseas software firms.5
1. See The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action (1993).
With this document, the federal government announced its policy on the In-
ternet and other networks which will make up the National Information Infra-
structure (NII). The policy consists of nine principles which include (a) promot-
ing private sector investment to expand competition, spur economic growth and
create new businesses which benefit the American consumer, (b) promoting
seamless, interactive, user-driven operation of the NII to enhance openness in
communications and (c) to ensure information security and network reliability.
Id. The last principle includes an action item to review United States policy on
encryption technology. Id.
2. "Encryption is a means of scrambling data so that parties may send and
receive private messages." Memorandum from Congressional Research Service,
American Law Division, The Library of Congress, Overview of Legal Issues In-
volving Exports of Encryption Technology 1 (Mar. 12, 1996) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Overview].
3. See, e.g., Digital Privacy and Security Working Group, Electronic Fron-
tier Found., Privacy Security, and the National Information Infrastructure 2
(1993) ("Without strong cryptography, no one will have the confidence to use
networks to conduct business, to engage in commercial transactions electroni-
cally, or to transmit sensitive personal information."). See also Martin E.
Hellnan, Implications of Encryption Policy on the National Information Infra-
structure, Computer Law., Feb. 1994, at 28.
4. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
5. See Export Controls on Mass Market Software, 1993: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment of the House For-
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Civil libertarians charge that the export provisions restrict
domestic communications on public cryptography, violating
the First Amendment.6 For over five years, the federal gov-
ernment has been locked in a policy stalemate over its export
controls on encryption, and Congress has introduced legisla-
tion to loosen controls several times, to no avail.7
In an effort to understand the contradictory export con-
trol policy and the current debate, this comment examines
the struggle occurring between the federal government,
software manufacturers, and civil libertarians over this criti-
cal technology. After a discussion of the importance of en-
cryption technology and how it works,' Part II reviews the
regulatory process for encryption exports.9 The remainder of
Part II and Part III introduces the constitutional debate sur-
rounding the export laws.10
The comment concludes in Part IV that although the gov-
ernment has amended the regulations in response to pres-
sure from business groups, its method of providing very nar-
row exceptions to an overly broad regulation has not
succeeded in resolving the constitutional problems. 1 ' The
Arms Export Control Act's (AECA) exemption from judicial
review, albeit limited, and several International Traffic in
Arms Regulation (ITAR) definitions unconstitutionally re-
eign Affairs Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1993) [hereinafter Trade and En-
vironment] (testimony of Ray Ozzie, Pres. of Iris Associates on behalf of the
Business Software Alliance). See also Export Control Reform in High Technol-
ogy, 1993: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 125, 128 (1993) (statement of Derrel De Passe, Vice-
Pres. Worldwide Governmental Relations, Varian Associates, Inc. on behalf of
the American Electronics Association).
6. See American Civil Liberties Union, Cryptographic Issue Statements:
Letter to the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (1993), in
BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 409, 411-12 (Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1994).
7. The last bill to be voted on was introduced by Rep. Maria Cantwell.
H.R. 3627, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). It was removed by a unanimous vote
of the House Intelligence Committee. The Committee replaced it with a re-
quirement that a government study be conducted to determine whether ex-
isting controls over encryption were outdated. Overview, supra note 2, at 8.
Three bills to relax export controls on encryption were introduced during the
1 0 4 h Congress. S. 1726, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), S. 1587, 104th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1996), H.R. 3011, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
8. See discussion infra part II.A-B.2.
9. See discussion infra part II.B.3. See also discussion infra part V for an
update and analysis of the December 1996 amendments to the regulations.
10. See discussion infra part II.C and part III.
11. See discussion infra part IV.A.
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strict cryptographic communications and leave the legislation
open to attack on free speech and due process grounds.
12
Part V augments the analysis in Part IV with a discussion of
the impact of the December 1996 Bernstein decision and ju-
risdictional shift in export regulations.
13
Part V concludes that recent developments do not resolve
the constitutional problems posed in Part IV. 14 Part VI pro-
poses that Congress enact comprehensive encryption control
reform legislation which meets First Amendment strict scru-
tiny standards. 5 If Congress fails to act, then courts hearing
First and Fifth Amendment challenges should limit exemp-
tions from judicial review and strike offending provisions in
the export control laws to bring them into constitutional con-
formance.16 The challenge facing the federal government is
finding a way to empower its signals intelligence and law en-
forcement agencies without destroying a major sector of the
economy and without violating the constitutional rights of its
citizens.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The National Debate
1. The Struggle over Encryption Technology
Encryption, the process of encoding and decoding infor-
mation, has become an indispensable technology for protect-
ing information of all kinds from unauthorized disclosure.
1 7
With the tremendous growth of telecommunications and com-
puter technologies over the past two decades, cryptography,
which has been around for centuries, is now routinely re-
quired and used by businesses in mass-marketed applications
software.' 8
Data encryption is currently employed in networking,
word processing, e-mail, and many other communication
12. See discussion infra part 1V.B.
13. See discussion infra part V. The analysis in Part IV was current as of
November 1996. Part V, the Recent Developments section, is appended to re-
flect changes occurring in December of 1996 and to show how these events mod-
ify the analysis in Part IV.
14. See discussion infra part V.C.
15. See discussion infra part VI.A.
16. See discussion infra part VI.B.
17. See Cryptography (from Julius Caesar Through Public Key Cryptosys-
tems), in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 6, at 7.
18. See Trade and Environment, supra note 5, at 1-9.
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products. 19 It ensures the security of electronic funds trans-
fers and is used extensively in wireless communications.2 °
Because it permits secure transactions on a relatively un-
secure worldwide computer network, this technology is seen
as essential to the commercial expansion of the Internet.21
Because early use of cryptography was primarily for in-
telligence gathering and securing military communications,
the Defense Department, through the National Security
Agency (NSA) has played a key role, both in the development
of the science and in the control of its use in the United States
and abroad.22 The NSA views the spread of cryptography as
a threat to national security and has continued efforts, begun
just after World War II, to control the development and ex-
pansion of cryptography in the private sector.23 The govern-
ment contends that "[t]he uncontrolled availability abroad of
cryptographic devices and software would hinder the United
States' ability to gather foreign intelligence on national se-
curity and foreign policy matters."2
4
In addition to export controls, the government has tried
to slow the growth and dissemination of cryptography
through control of public funding for cryptography, patent
publications, and the dissemination of scientific papers at ac-
ademic conferences. 25 In 1975, the NSA tried to stop all Na-
tional Science Foundation (NSF) grants for cryptology re-
search.26 The two agencies agreed on coordinated funding
and review procedures which now allow the NSA to review all
19. Microsoft Windows NT, Novell Netware, FileApps by HDC Corporation,
and Lotus Notes are a few examples of business applications software using
data encryption.
20. Ira S. Rubenstein, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in COPING
WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 1994, at 181 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. A-705).
21. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
22. Kenneth J. Pierce, Public Cryptography, Arms Export Controls, and the
First Amendment: A Need for Legislation, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 202
(1984).
23. Id.
24. Declaration of William J. Lowell, Director of the Office of Defense Trade
Controls (ODTC) at 3, Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 n.19 (D.D.C.
1996), appeal docketed, No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
25. Pierce, supra note 22, at 203. Pierce has a good discussion of the history
of NSA attempts to control dissemination of cryptography in these areas. See
also Susan Landau et al., Association for Computing Machinery, Cryptography
in Public: A Brief History, in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER supra note 6, at 43.
26. Pierce, supra note 22, at 203.
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applications pertaining to cryptography and gives the agency
control of the funding decisions.27
The NSA attempted to control private patent publica-
tions and the presentation of papers on cryptography at aca-
demic conferences. 28 Each attempt was met with public criti-
cism from the academic community, resulting in the NSA
withdrawing from its extreme position.29
However, the export control regime, which for crypto-
graphic exports consists of the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA)3 0 and the Export Administration Act (EAA),3 1 is still
in place. These statutes and their implementing regulations
continue to control the exportation of strong encryption3 2 and
represent the last remaining controls the government has at
its disposal to control the spread of public cryptography.
33
2. United States Policy on Encryption Controls
There is widespread agreement that the export controls
on encryption hamper United States competitiveness 34 and
cause United States firms to lose worldwide market share for
27. Id. at 203-04.
28. Id. at 204.
29. Id.
30. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
22 U.S.C. §§ 2778-96 (1988).
31. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988)).
32. The term "strong encryption" refers to systems that are reasonably se-
cure, such that the time, effort, and money required to break the system is
greater than what the data is worth to most people, thereby making the effort to
break the system futile. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY (John
Wiley & Sons, 2d ed., 1996) for a more thorough discussion of encryption
strength.
33. Although technically the State Department through the Office of De-
fense Trade Controls (ODTC) has control of the administration of exports with
encryption under the AECA, this office must seek the Defense Department's
(NSA's) concurrence with its decisions. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/NSIAD-93-67, EXPORT CONTROLS: ISSUES IN REMOVING MILITARILY SENSI-
TIVE ITEMS FROM THE MUNITIONS LIST, 11-21 (1993) [hereinafter Removing Mili-
tarily Sensitive Items]. In one instance, the State Department attempted to
transfer export administration of mass market software to Commerce Depart-
ment jurisdiction because it did not believe it was possible to control such
software. Id. at 20. The NSA refused to allow the transfer, citing Commerce
Department controls as inadequate and fears that such a move would lead to
decontrol of encryption. Id. at 21. The NSA prevailed in the dispute and en-
cryption software remained under State Department jurisdiction. Id.
34. The competitiveness of the software industry is not the focus of this
comment. However, the impact of business groups must be examined to under-
stand the development of export control laws as applied to encryption, since the
163
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mass marketed software, an industry which United States
firms previously dominated. 5
In January of 1996, the Clinton Administration acknowl-
edged this predicament and expressed some willingness to
ease controls.36 Then Secretary of the Commerce, Ron
Brown, admitted that "[i]f your foreign competitors are ex-
porting products with encryption capability and you are not,
that puts you at a tremendous competitive disadvantage." 7
The Administration's admission stemmed from a joint
study by the NSA and the Commerce Department on the ef-
fect of export controls on United States competitiveness.3
This study concluded what business groups and scholars
have been arguing for several years: Encryption controls are
harming United States firms.3 United States companies
stand to lose as much as thirty percent of the $200 billion in
United States computer system sales expected in the year
2000 because of these export restrictions on encryption.a
The NSA, however, relies heavily on the limited availa-
bility and use of cryptography to carry out its functions.4 '
The agency is responsible for ensuring that government com-
munications and data are secure, and that the United States
is able to intercept and decipher the codes of other coun-
tries.42 Most people would agree that keeping government
communications secure and intercepting the transmissions of
foreign countries are critical to an effective foreign policy and
national security.43 In fact, many in Congress consider the
impetus for legislative and regulatory change in this area comes largely from
these groups. See, e.g., note 137 infra and accompanying text.
35. Charles L. Evans, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: Efforts
to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to
Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J.INT'L LAW & COM. REG. 469-70 (1994).
See also Mark B. Hartzler, National Security Export Controls on Data Encryp-
tion-How They Limit U.S. Competitiveness, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 438-39 (1994).
36. Scrambled Software Gets an OK, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 13, 1996, at
1D.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 35 (for a discussion on the harm to
United States competitiveness).
40. Scrambled Software Gets an OK, supra note 36, at 1D.
41. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 436-57 (1983).
42. Pierce, supra note 22, at 201.
43. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has argued that
widespread availability of strong encryption makes it difficult if not impossible
for government agencies to effectively use wiretaps against criminals, drug
dealers, and terrorists. If law enforcement becomes ineffective as a result of the
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NSA to be the "single most important source of intelligence
for the nation."44
3. The Effectiveness of the Controls
What is problematic is the plausibility of the govern-
ment's stated policy reasons for restricting public cryptogra-
phy exports, given the availability of strong cryptography
outside the United States.4" The government contends that
the uncontrolled availability overseas of cryptographic de-
vices and software impede the United States' ability to gather
foreign intelligence on national security and foreign policy
matters.46 However, exports of software with encryption
from the United States cannot reasonably be expected to sub-
stantially affect the availability of strong encryption in other
countries, since such products are widely available in so
many countries. 47 A recent study conducted by the Software
Publishers Association found cryptographic products
equivalent or better than United States products to be dis-
tributed by at least 340 companies in 22 countries.48 The
NSA refuses to make public its additional reasons for its ac-
tions regarding cryptography. 49 They are considered
classified.5 0
It is more likely that the government is trying to control
public cryptography in the United States because of its poten-
tial to create new encryption systems that its agencies cannot
break, or at least, in which U.S. agencies must invest sub-
proliferation of encryption, the results could be an increase in loss of life, attrib-
utable to an inability to prevent terrorist acts and murders, an increase in cor-
ruption and in the availability of illegal drugs, and a substantial increase in
undetected and unprosecuted violent crimes. See generally, Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Technology, Environment, and Aviation of the Committee on
Science, Space and Technology at 16-18, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (state-
ment of James K. Kallstrom, Special Agent in Charge, Special Operations Divi-
sion, New York Field Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
44. Pierce, supra note 22, at 202 (quote by Senator Walter Mondale on the
role played by the NSA).
45. Testimony by Stephen T. Walker before the Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the United States Senate (May 3,
1994), in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 478 (Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1994) [hereinaf-
ter Testimony].
46. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47. See Testimony, supra note 45, at 478-79.
48. Id. at 478.
49. See Evans, supra note 35, at 492.
50. Removing Militarily Sensitive Items, supra note 33, at 21.
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stantial time and resources to break.51 The government,
thus, has a significant interest in making sure that no strong
cryptography is developed which is not under its control.
Because the NSA was once the dominant producer of
more advanced cryptography - possibly worldwide - and
still possesses much of the expertise in this area,52 this
agency in particular has a strong interest in maintaining the
status quo. The development of public cryptography may ex-
pose weaknesses in the systems used by the NSA, on which it
must rely to do its intelligence work.53 This might happen,
for example, because advances in the science reveal certain
features in the systems employed by United States defense
agencies which other countries may then exploit.
5 4
Advances in the science may also alert other nations to
the vulnerabilities in their own systems, or to the NSA's abil-
ity to decipher the systems employed by other nations. 5
Thus, they would change their encryption systems and the
NSA would be faced with having to crack new, advanced sys-
tems. Whatever the reason, concerns about U.S. encryption
policy focus on the NSA's attempts to slow the growth and
dissemination of cryptographic devices both abroad and
within the United States. 6
4. The Constitutional Problem: The First and Fifth
Amendments
If, in fact, the government is using export laws to control
the dissemination of strong cryptography not only abroad,
but also within the United States, then it is effectively apply-
ing regulations designed for national security administration
to achieve control over the domestic development of cryptog-
raphy.5 17 This situation poses serious First and Fifth Amend-
51. SCHNEIER, supra note 32, at 597-98.
52. Id. at 598.
53. Id. at 597-98.
54. See Bamford, supra note 41.
55. See SCHNEIER, supra note 32, at 597-98.
56. Id.
57. See Testimony, supra note 45, at 487; see also Evans, supra note 35, at
480.
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ment concerns. 58 At the very least, it can be argued that the
administration has exceeded its statutory authority.59
In defining terms for the control of exports overbroadly,
so as to include cryptographic communications, and in requir-
ing a license prior to publication, the government arguably
imposes a prior restraint on publication, thereby violating the
First Amendment.6 ° In addition, because the export control
statutes do not allow for judicial review of the agency's deter-
mination and do not allow one to appeal except to the director
of the overseeing agency, they may also violate Fifth Amend-
ment due process rights.61
It is not only civil libertarians that have voiced many of
these concerns.62 The United States Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel has concluded on three different occa-
sions that the AECA and ITAR, as applied to cryptography
are likely unconstitutional. 63 It is their opinion that the ex-
port control statutes and regulations can be applied unconsti-
tutionally to regulate speech and the licensing scheme may
operate as a prior restraint.64
B. Understanding Encryption
In order to follow the debate surrounding the export con-
trol laws as they apply to cryptography, it is necessary to dis-
cuss how encryption works to secure electronic communica-
tions and the specifics of the regulations.
1. Encryption Basics
If a sender wants to send a secure message to a receiver,
the sender can encrypt the message to disguise its sub-
58. Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General,
United States Justice Dept., Office of Legal Counsel (May 11, 1978), in BUILD-
ING IN BIG BROTHER 537, 539-48 (Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1994) [hereinafter Har-
mon Memo].
59. Harmon Memo, supra note 58, at 537-38.
60. Allen M. Shinn, Jr., The First Amendment and the Export Laws: Free
Speech on Scientific and Technical Matters, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 368, 401
(1990).
61. Id. at 389.
62. Cryptographic Issue Statements: Letter to the Computer System Se-
curity and Privacy Advisory Board from the American Civil Liberties Union
(May 28, 1993), in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 409 (Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1994).
63. Memorandum for David R. Robinson, Legal Advisor, Department of
State (July 5, 1984) (on file with author) [hereinafter Robinson Memo]; 5 U.S.
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 202 (1981); Harmon Memo, supra note 58, at 546-48.
64. Robinson Memo, supra note 63, at 1 nn. 1-2.
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stance. 65 The undisguised message is called plaintext or
cleartext, and the encrypted message is known as
ciphertext.66 The process of turning ciphertext back into the
original plaintext is decryption.67
A cryptographic algorithm, also called a cipher, is a
mathematical function used for encryption and decryption.68
There are usually two related functions to an algorithm, one
for encryption and the other for decryption. 69 "The art and
science of keeping messages secure is cryptography, and it is
practiced by cryptographers. Cryptanalysts are practitioners
of cryptanalysis, the art and science of breaking cipher
text."70
The security of early algorithms was dependent on the
users' ability to keep secret the way the algorithm works.71
Modern cryptography has solved this problem by using a key
(or keys).72 Keys are inversely related, such that what one
does, the other can undo.73 What needs to be kept secret in
modern cryptography is the key, not the algorithm itself.74
This allows the algorithm to be published and analyzed by its
potential users. 75 Also, the fact that the algorithm is freely
available means that products with the algorithm are more
easily mass produced. 6 As long as people do not have your
key, they cannot decrypt your messages, even though they
have the encryption algorithm.77
a. Single Key Systems
There are two types of modern (key-based) algorithms.78
The first type is the symmetric algorithm, also called private
65. See SCHNEIER, supra note 32, at 1.
66. Id.
67. Deborah Russell and G.T. Gangemi, Sr., Computer Security Basics
(1991), reprinted in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 10, 14 (Lance J. Hoffman ed.,
1994) [hereinafter Computer Security Basics].
68. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 714 (1995).
69. SCHNEIER, supra note 32, at 2.
70. Id. at 1.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id.
73. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 183.
74. Id.
75. SCHNEIER, supra note 32, at 3.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 3-4.
78. Computer Security Basics, supra note 67, at 19.
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key or single key cryptography. 79 A single key is used both to
encrypt and to decrypt the message.8 0 A separate key is
needed for each pair of users who exchange messages, and
both sides must keep the key a secret to keep the system
secure.
8 1
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is an ex-
ample of a private key system.8 2 The main problem with this
type of system is key exchange. 3 In order for the system to
work, a pair of users must exchange keys and keep them se-
cret, which requires a reliable method for distributing the
keys.84 Key exchange is a potential breach of security in the
system because more than one person must be trusted with a
confidential key, and because the key could be discovered
during an exchange.
b. Asymmetric Key Systems
The second type of encryption algorithm was devised to
solve the key exchange problem. 5 This algorithm is an
asymmetric key system or public key cryptography,8 6 which
uses two keys, a public key and a private key for each individ-
ual user. 7 A user must keep his or her private key secret,
but the user's public key may be published freely.88 In fact,
the public keys can be listed in a directory of electronic mail
addresses, similar to a phone book.8 9
An individual's public and private keys are mathemati-
cally related, such that if a sender encrypts a message with
the receiver's public key, only the receiver can decrypt it with
his or her private key.9° The sender does not have to know
the receiver's private key to encrypt the message.9' Because
only the receiver's private key can decrypt the message, the
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 183.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. RSA and PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) are examples of public key
systems.
87. Computer Security Basics, supra note 67, at 19.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 184.
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sender knows that only the intended receiver is getting the
message.9 2 The only way to break security in the public key
system 93 is by giving away your private key.9 4 This is far less
likely to happen, since no private key exchange is necessary
for the system to function.95
2. Encryption Keeps Communications Secure
The security of an encryption system is directly related to
the length of its key (or keys).9 6 The longer the key length,
the larger the number of possible combinations. Thus, as the
key length is increased, it takes more time (or more comput-
ing power) for a cryptanalyst to uncover the key, and the sys-
tem is more secure.
The two most widely used systems are DES and RSA.97
The symmetric key DES system has a fixed key length of 56
bits. 98 International Business Machines (IBM) developed
DES in conjunction with the NSA, and it is an approved gov-
ernment standard.99 The details of the algorithm are freely
available from the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST).100 DES is readily available overseas, yet the
ODTC does not allow its export from the United States except
in two very limited circumstances. 10 1 DES is widely used by
banks and other financial institutions for their electronic
communications, including electronic funds transfers.
10 2
92. Id. at 183-84.
93. Security in a public key system is a function of the difficulty of deriving
the private key from the public key. Id. at 183-84. The inverse mathematical
relationship between the two keys makes this very difficult. Id. Because so
much computing power is needed for this task, the security of the system is
enhanced. See generally SCHNEIER, supra note 32, at 8 (discussing computing
power and security).
94. This is an oversimplification in that there is an esoteric problem of cor-
ruption of public keys. However, compared to the potential security breach in-
herent in symmetric key systems, this is a minor problem. See SCHNEIER, supra
note 32, at 8, for an in-depth discussion of algorithm security.
95. Computer Security Basics, supra note 67, at 19.
96. Id:
97. See Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 184, for a discussion of what is cur-
rently used today. See also notes 106-08 infra and accompanying text.
98. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 184.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 185.
101. The exceptions are if it is used by a financial institution for securing
financial transactions or by subsidiaries owned at least 51% by United States
corporations. See Id. at 185-86.
102. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 182.
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The privately developed asymmetric key RSA system has
variable length keys. 10 3 It was developed by three mathema-
ticians (Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adelman),
after whom it is named. 10 4 RC2 and RC4 are two additional
asymmetric encryption algorithms designed by Ron Rivest,
which also have variable key lengths, and when used with
longer key lengths are considered good alternatives to
DES. 10 5 Public key, or asymmetric systems, require much
longer key lengths than symmetric systems to maintain an
equivalent security level. 10 6 As will be discussed, the AECA
and ITAR regime restricts the exportation of all products us-
ing DES, as well as those products using RSA which have a
key length over 40 bits.1 0 7 Many cryptographers believe that
the encryption currently allowed under export controls is
inadequate. 108
The implications of these technologies should be empha-
sized. Particularly with public key encryption, where no pre-
arranged trust relationship is required between parties to ob-
tain secure communications, the benefits of the technology is
immediately apparent. The ability to publish one's public key
along with one's electronic mail address, allows for wide-
spread and regular use of the system for secure and private
103. Id. at 185.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 186.
106. There are a number of technical reasons for this which are well ex-
plained in SCHNEIER, supra note 32, at Chapter 7. The following table shows
that public key systems such as RSA need a much longer key length to get the
equivalent security protection.
Symmetric Public-key
Key Length Key Length
56 bits 384 bits
64 bits 512 bits
80 bits 768 bits
112 bits 1792 bits
128 bits 2304 bits
Id. at 166, tbl. 7.9.
107. See infra part II.B.3 for a discussion of ITAR restrictions and part V for
an update and analysis of the December 1996 amendments to the export laws
under Executive Order 13026.
108. Cryptographers now recommend a minimum key length of 75-90 bits
and consider the 56 bit DES and 40 bit RC2 and RC4 systems to offer inade-
quate protection. Matt Blaze et al., Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ci-
phers to Provide Adequate Commercial Security: A Report by an Ad Hoc Group
of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists, (visited Jan. 1996) <http'/
www.bsa.org.>.
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communications.10 9 Ensuring security and privacy in one's
communications, both domestic and international, by utiliz-
ing a strong encryption system, is seen as essential to the ex-
pansion of the Internet and other networks, as media for both
political discourse and commerce. 110
3. The Regulation of Cryptographic Exports"'
The U.S. export control of cryptographic exports actually
consists of two schemes. A stricter one for "munitions" is gov-
erned by the Arms Export Control Act"1 2 (AECA), and a gen-
erally more lenient scheme for "dual-use" items, which have
both civilian and military purpose, comes under the Export
Administration Act' 13 (EAA).
a. State Department and NSA Control of
Encryption Exports Through the USML
and Licensing
The State Department exercises authority over the
United States Munitions List (USML), which was created
under the authority of the AECA and is administered
through the ITAR.1 4 Requests to license items listed on the
USML are made through the Office for Defense Trade Con-
trols (ODTC) in the State Department, and regulatory deci-
sions are made with the concurrence of the Department of
Defense, through the NSA." 5 The Department of Commerce,
through its Bureau of Export Administration (BXA), makes
licensing decisions for the Commerce Control List (CCL), cre-
ated under the EAA and the implementing Export Adminis-
tration Regulations (EAR)." 16
Under penalty of criminal sanction, once an item is
placed on the USML or on the CCL, it may not be exported
without first obtaining an export license from the respective
109. Computer Security Basics, supra note 67, at 19.
110. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
111. See discussion supra part V for an update and analysis of the December
1996 amendments to the regulation of cryptographic exports.
112. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
22 U.S.C. §§ 2778-96 (1988).
113. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988)).
114. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (1994).
115. Removing Militarily Sensitive Items, supra note 33, at 10-11.
116. Id. at 12.
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Secretary. 117 The maximum penalty for violating AECA is
$1,000,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than ten
years,11 8 and the maximum penalty for an EAA violation is
five times the value of the exports or $1,000,000, whichever is
greater, and/or not more than 10 years imprisonment.11 9
The legislative purpose for controlling munitions, as
stated in the AECA policy provision, is to further "world
peace and the security and foreign policy of the United
States."1 20 The EAA purpose statement is much broader,
containing fifteen separate policy statements which include
the goals of regulating to restrict exports that increase the
military potential of other countries, controlling domestic
short supply, and ensuring American competitiveness in in-
ternational markets.
12 1
b. Encryption Is a "Munition" Subject to
Determination and Licensing Processes
The export control scheme considers data encryption a
"munition" or predominantly military in application, and
therefore views the regulations as necessary to safeguard the
national security of the United States. 2 2 The ODTC has pri-
mary jurisdiction over cryptographic software because it is
listed as a "munition" under Category XIII(b)(1) of the
USML. 123
To determine whether an item one wants to export is on
the USML, one must submit to the ODTC a Commodity Ju-
risdiction application (CJ).' 24 The ODTC then makes an indi-
vidual determination as to whether a person's item is subject
to State Department jurisdiction.125 Persons wishing to ex-
port items within State Department jurisdiction must regis-
ter as an arms dealer with the ODTC and apply for an indi-
117. Id. at 11-12.
118. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1993).
119. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b) (Supp. 1996). In the case of an individual, the
fine is not more than $250,000, instead of $1,000,000. Id.
120. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1993).
121. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(1)-(15) (Supp. 1996).
122. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XIII(b)(1) (1995).
123. Removing Militarily Sensitive Items, supra note 33, at 11.
124. Id.
125. See generally, Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 186-98, for a complete over-
view of the CJ process.
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vidually validated license. 126  In contrast to the AECA
scheme, the EAA provides for general licenses for software
and technology that is "publicly available" 127 and for mass
marketed software, permitting the exporter to classify the
items themselves and export without BXA processing an
application. 128
c. Extent of Control Over Encryption Export
Originally, Category XIII(b)(1) of ITAR included all cryp-
tographic systems.' 29 However, software manufacturing in-
dustry opposition resulted in a 1992 compromise by the gov-
ernment.' 30  Certain limited items are now allowed
"automatic" transfer to Commerce Department jurisdiction,
administered by the BXA. 13 1 These items are:
(1) decryption only for copy-protected software;
(2) bank or money transactions;
(3) cryptographic processing using analogue techniques
in certain radio and fax equipment;
(4) certain personalized "smart" cards;
(5) access control devices such as ATMs;
(6) data authentication;
(7) fixed data compression or coding techniques;
(8) set top decoders; and
(9) anti-virus software.132
Items which perform these and no other functions are
automatically transferred to BXA control and will generally
126. Id. at 199. An individually validated license requires an exporter to ap-
ply for a separate license for each end user. There are no general licenses under
ITAR. Id.
127. Publicly available software includes items (1) sold from stock at retail
selling points, (2) available in over the counter transactions and (3) designed for
installation by the user without support from the supplier. Larry E. Christen-
sen, Technology and Software Controls Including Recent Changes in Country
Scope, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROL 1994, at 161 (PLI Commercial
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-705).
128. See id. at 153-62. These less restrictive export controls are available to
persons exporting to most countries. However, more stringent controls are
placed on those exporting to certain countries deemed a threat to national se-
curity, such as Iran or Libya. Id.
129. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 187.
130. For procedures resulting from this compromise see id. at 195-96. For
the most recent (December 1996) changes to the regulations see part V.B.
131. Hartzler, supra note 35, at 444-45.
132. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XIII(b)(1)(i)-(ix) (1995).
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be classified under information securities in Category 5 of the
CCL. 133 This regime offers much less restrictive licensing
controls and shorter processing times.1 3 4 If the software per-
forms any other encryption functions than those listed in (1)-
(9), however, it continues to be subject to ITAR.' 35 The com-
promise also established expedited transfers of mass-mar-
keted software if the software uses the RC2 or RC4 algorithm
and has a key length less than 40 bits.1 3 6 This expedited
transfer authority is referred to as the SPA Agreement.
1 3 7
All items not meeting these characteristics for expedited
processing are subject to case-by-case review by the ODTC.138
Most industry analysts agree that while the compromise
makes an attempt at expedited processing and an easing of
restrictions, the current controls are still too restrictive to be
useful for most exporters of mass-marketed software. 139 Fur-
ther, algorithms that are not mass-marketed presumably
would not qualify for the less onerous controls if they did not
fall into categories (1)-(9) above.
The AECA and EAA, as interpreted by the administering
agencies, also differ significantly in the ability to appeal deci-
sions and the availability of judicial review. While appeal
and judicial review of agency decisions under the EAA are
limited by a statutory preclusion from the APA, this scheme
contains well defined procedures for bringing claims to court
and definitive time limits for agency action.1 40 Under the
133. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 195.
134. See Removing Militarily Sensitive Items, supra note 33, at 12.
135. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 195.
136. Id. at 195-96.
137. SPA stands for the agreement the Bush Administration reached with
the Software Publishers Association, a business group of software
manufacturers.
138. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 197.
139. Robert Holleyman, Pres., Business Software Alliance, On the Export of
Software with Encryption Capabilities, Testimony at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (Sept. 6, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hol-
leyman Testimony].
140. See John Ellicott, et al., Judicial Review Under Export Laws, in COPING
WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 1994, at 357-62 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. A-705). The procedures include the ability to ap-
peal civil enforcement actions to an administrative law judge (ALJ), review of
the ALJ decision by the Secretary of Commerce, and appeal of the Secretary's
decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. at
357-59. For penalty determinations brought by the BXA, an exporter may be
heard in a federal district court, which is empowered to determine de novo all
issues necessary to the establishment of liability. Id. at 359-60. For adminis-
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ODTC's interpretation of the AECA, the CJ process allows
only for appeals within the executive branch of govern-
ment 141 and there are no time limits within which the agency
must act in rendering a final decision.' 4 2
C. Constitutional Challenges
The current export regime on encryption raises several
First Amendment issues. First, government regulations are
potentially being used not just to prevent exports, but to stifle
communication about encryption, in that the regulations pro-
hibit an individual from publishing information in any way
that would make it available to a foreign national. 143 Since
this covers almost any dissemination of cryptographic com-
munications, it is a potential violation of First Amendment
protection for political, commercial and scientific speech.1
4 4
Civil libertarians also argue that encryption makes pri-
vacy in speech possible for electronic communications, and
thus should enjoy special protection under the First Amend-
ment. 145 Cryptography functions like an "envelope" for elec-
trative claims by an exporter, the EAA allows for a limited action in federal
district court to compel the agency to act on an application. Id. at 361-62.
141. The appeals process can be described as follows:
Appeals can be made from an initial CJ determination at the Office of
Defense Trade Control to the Director of the Center for Defense Trade,
who must reply within 30 days. If the decision at the Center for De-
fense Trade is unsatisfactory, a further appeal can be lodged with the
Assistant Secretary for International Politico-Military Affairs, who
does not have a time limit for reply.
Evan R. Berlack, Some Export Licensing Problems and How to Cope with Them,
in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 1994, at 335-36 (PLI Commercial Law
& Practice Series No. A-705).
142. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.7 (1993).
143. See discussion infra part V.A.
144. See Shinn, supra note 60, at 379. See also United States v. Edler, 579 F.
2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978). Although litigated under a precursor statute to the
AECA, this case is one of the few making a First Amendment challenge to the
export regime. In this case, an exporter of missile components was convicted of
violating the Mutual Security Act of 1954 by exporting without a license and
appealed on First Amendment and overbreadth grounds. Id. at 516-18. The
court held that the statute as applied in the commercial speech context did not
interfere with constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 519-21. Additionally,
the court narrowly construed the technical data definition so that the exports
had to be "significantly and directly related to specific articles on the Munitions
List." Id. at 521. The court also mentioned in dicta that the effect on speech in
such circumstances as Edler's might be considered incidental, in which case a
less stringent First Amendment test is allowed, as given in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Id. at 520.
145. See supra note 6, at 412.
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tronic communications: Requiring people to send their elec-
tronic mail unencrypted is analogous to requiring people to
use only postcards. 14 6 When one knows that potentially any-
one can read otherwise private communications, one will tend
to communicate only that which is not private.
147
1. Berstein v. United States: A Free Speech Challenge
to AECA and ITAR
Because the AECA and ITAR, as enforced by the ODTC
and NSA, potentially restrict cryptographic communication
as well as exports of the technology, First Amendment chal-
lenges to the application of ITAR to encryption devices have
been filed and are now being decided in federal courts. 148 The
first, Bernstein v. United States, 149 was brought by a mathe-
matics graduate student at the University of California at
Berkeley, 150 who developed an algorithm named "Snuffle"
and wished to post it on the Internet for review by other cryp-
tographers. He submitted a CJ application to the ODTC for
three items: a paper on his algorithm and two source code
files. 1 1 In his application correspondence with the ODTC,
Bernstein was informed that his "Snuffle" commodity was
subject to AECA jurisdiction and would require him to regis-
ter as an arms dealer and obtain a license. 152
Bernstein argues that this restriction effectively prohib-
its him not only from posting his cryptography on the In-
ternet (which reaches beyond U.S. borders), but also from any
publication, since dissemination in almost any form is likely
to be disclosed to some foreign national in the United States
146. The envelope analogy has become popular in the literature on encryp-
tion. See e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 183. This postcard example is
taken from Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Mo-
tion for Partial Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication of Issues at
15, Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (No. 95-
00582).
147. Plaintiffs Memorandum at 15, Bernstein (No. 95-00582).
148. Currently, two cases are before the courts. Bernstein v. United States,
922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (order denying motion to dismiss); Karn v.
United States, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal docketed, No. 96-5121 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
149. Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (order
denying motion to dismiss).
150. Bernstein has since received his doctorate and is teaching at the Uni-
versity of Illinois.
151. Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. at 1430.
152. Id.
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and, therefore, would meet the definition of an "export" under
ITAR. 153
In addition to violations of the First Amendment, over-
breadth and vagueness, Bernstein contends15 4 that the regu-
lations fail to provide procedural safeguards against unbri-
dled discretion and arbitrary and capricious action by
regulators, thus, violating his due process rights.155  He
asked the court to declare these provisions of ITAR and
AECA unconstitutional and in violation of the Administrative
Procedures Act"5 6 (APA), and sought an injunction to restrain
the ODTC from preventing publication.
1 5 7
Bernstein's claim survived a motion to dismiss by the
government.'13 The Bernstein case has attracted a great deal
of attention in the legal and mainstream press because the
trial court concluded that Bernstein's source code is speech
for purposes of the First Amendment.'5 9 Essentially, this
conclusion, and the denial of the motion to dismiss, cleared
the way for a full consideration of the First and Fifth Amend-
ment issues.
153. See discussion infra part IV.A.1 (giving the ITAR definition for export).
154. Complaint at 23-46, Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (No. 95-0582).
155. To make these First and Fifth Amendment arguments, Bernstein relies
on several important cases, all of which are discussed infra in part IV.B-C.
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), provides the plaintiff with a strenu-
ous free speech test against licensing statutes which operate as prior restraints
on expression. Here, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional sections of a
Maryland statute which required motion picture exhibitors to submit films for
prior approval and obtain a license. Id. at 60. The Court held that before any
restraint upon protected expression may become final, it must be subjected to
prompt judicial review in a proceeding in which the government will bear the
burden of justifying its decisions. Id. at 58-59. In New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), where the government sought to enjoin newspapers
from publishing the contents of a classified historical study on United States
policy in Vietnam, the Supreme Court held that "[any system of prior re-
straints of expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity." Id. at 714. Finally, Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697 (1931), holds that while prior restraints on speech are not uncon-
stitutional per se, they are nearly so. Id. at 700.
156. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976).
157. Complaint at 51, Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (No. 95-0582).
158. Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
159. Source Code Is 'Speech' Under First Amendment, District Court Rules,
COMPUTER LAW., May 1996, at 28-29.
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2. Karn v. United States: Encryption as a
Functional Commodity
Another recently filed case was, Karn v. United States, 
160
which also makes First and Fifth Amendment challenges to
the AECA and seeks to have provisions of ITAR declared un-
constitutional and in violation of the APA. 16 1 The contro-
versy in this case concerns Philip Karn, a telecommunica-
tions engineer who has also developed several cryptographic
algorithms. 16
2
Karn submitted two CJ applications to the ODTC for a
determination. The first was for a published book containing
a collection of algorithms 163 and the second was for the same
algorithms on a floppy disk.164 The ODTC determined that
the book, which contained the algorithms in printed form,
was not subject to its export jurisdiction because it was in the
public domain. 16 5 However, the information on the floppy
disk (which was identical to that in printed form in the book)
was nonetheless subject to its jurisdiction because it was in
the form of source code and thus considered a functional com-
modity. 166 Karn was therefore required to register as an
arms dealer and obtain an export license for the material on
the floppy, but he was able to freely export the book.
167
Even though it was the same information, the material
on the floppy was considered technical information because it
did not meet the definition for a public domain exception
under ITAR.' 68 Karn appealed the ODTC's CJ decision on
the floppy disk.169 Similar to Bernstein, Karn brought the
160. Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal docketed,
No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
161. Complaint, Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal
docketed, No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
162. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 205.
163. The book submitted was BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY
(John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed. 1996).
164. Declaration of Phillip Karn at 4, Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1996), appeal docketed, No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
165. Declaration of William J. Lowell, Director of the Office of Defense Trade
Controls at 11, Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal
docketed, No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
166. See Plaintiffs Opposition at 3, Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1996), appeal docketed, No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
167. Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 205-06.
168. Plaintiffs Opposition at 7, Karn (95-01812).
169. Complaint at 2, Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996),
appeal docketed, No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
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challenge on First Amendment speech grounds, as well as
Fifth Amendment due process grounds. 170
In contrast to Bernstein's, Karn's challenge did not sur-
vive the government's motion to dismiss.17 1 Relying on the
political question doctrine, the court dismissed the APA claim
as nonjusticiable and granted summary judgment to the gov-
ernment on the constitutional claims, stating that the issues
posed by Karn were policy questions to be decided by the
elected branches of government. 172 Karn's attorneys have
filed a notice of appeal.
73
Many people following the debate are perplexed by the
different conclusions reached by the Bernstein and Karn
courts.' 74 Practitioners recognize that the decision handed
down in Bernstein may be far reaching. 1 75 Bernstein and
Karn are being watched closely not only by civil libertarians
who want to protect privacy, but also by the business sec-
tor.' 76 The business sector, of course, is concerned about the
competitiveness of the U.S. software industry, which feels
threatened by the export restrictions.17
7
But, there is more at stake for the commercial sector. A
successful challenge to the export laws as applied to encryp-
tion could mean wider availability of high-quality encryption
in software products overall.'17  Additionally, the ability to
ensure security and privacy in one's communications, both
170. Complaint at 2, Karn (95-01812).
171. Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. at 2 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal docketed,
No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
172. Id. at 3.
173. The notice of appeal was filed on April 19, 1996.
174. David J. Loundy, Two Rulings on Encryption Speak Different Lan-
guages, CHI. DAILY LAW BULLETIN, May 9, 1996 at 6; A Tale of Two Crypto Court
Cases: Are Karn and Bernstein Judges on the Same Planet?, INFORMATION LAW
ALERT (May 3, 1996) <httpJ/www.infolawalert.com.>.
175. Edward J. Radlo, Legal Issues in Cryptography, COMPUTER LAW., MAY
1996, at 1, 8.
176. Holleyman Testimony, supra note 139.
177. See supra part II.A.2.
178. Software firms often complain that they have to develop separate pro-
grams for domestic and international markets; strong encryption for domestic
products because people demand it in their software, and weak encryption for
international sales because of the restrictions. See Holleyman Testimony, supra
note 139. This dual development of products is costly to create and maintain
and puts them at a significant competitive disadvantage. Id. at 2-4. Some firms
avoid incorporating encryption into their software products altogether because
they do not want to register as an arms dealer or have to become proficient at
"munitions" exporting. See Hartzler, supra note 35.
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domestic and international, is essential to the expansion of
the Internet both as a forum for political discourse and for
commercial purposes.
179
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
By responding to business group pressures with incre-
mental changes to the export laws, the government has failed
to resolve the First and Fifth Amendment issues raised by
the application of export controls to data encryption. Several
activities which involve the domestic dissemination of crypto-
graphic material continue to be prohibited, despite recent
amendments.
Courts are now faced with resolution of these issues.
Judges have to decide whether the activities involve speech
or functional commodities (conduct). The question of whether
the controls have a "chilling effect" on speech, and whether
the licensing scheme is a prior restraint, must also be an-
swered. If a court decides that the regulations are written
overbroadly, it may also have to rule on whether the agency
has exceeded its authority. Finally, the question of whether
the court has subject matter jurisdiction, given that these are
matters of foreign policy and national security, must be re-
solved. This political question claim, and the fact that the
export schemes contain exemptions from judicial review, re-
quires careful consideration of Fifth Amendment due process
rights.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Examining the ITAR Provisions
1. Key Definitions in ITAR
The first step is to examine key provisions in ITAR to
determine whether they are written so as to include the do-
mestic dissemination of cryptography, or communication
about cryptography, which may impinge on the First
Amendment.
a. Export
Under ITAR, the definition for export includes "[s]ending
or taking a defense article out of the United States in any
179. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
181
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manner, except by mere travel outside of the United States
by a person whose personal knowledge includes technical
data," or "[d]isclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or
transferring technical data to a foreign person, whether in
the United States or abroad."18 0 The plain meaning of this
language indicates that it includes all activity which com-
municates cryptographic information to a foreign person,
even individuals within the United States.
It is this language that the plaintiff in Bernstein finds so
objectionable."" 1 There, the plaintiff argues that this overly
broad language permits the State Department to restrict any
and all communications about cryptography, even communi-
cation within the United States, and therefore violates the
First Amendment.1 8
2
b. Technical Data
The technical data definition may also be too broad to
hold any reasonable limitations on the administering agency.
"Technical data" is defined as:
(1) Information, other than software as defined in
§ 120.10(d), which is required for the design develop-
ment, production, manufacture, assembly, operation,
repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense
articles. This includes information in the form of
blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions
and documentation;
(2) Classified information relating to defense articles and
defense services;
(3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order;
(4) Software as defined in § 121.8(f) of this subchapter di-
rectly related to defense articles;
(5) This definition does not include information concern-
ing general scientific, mathematical or engineering
principles commonly taught in schools, colleges and
universities or information in the public domain as de-
fined in § 120.11. It also does not include basic mar-
keting information on function or purpose or general
system descriptions of defense articles.1 8 3
180. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (1), (4) (1996).
181. Complaint at 11, Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (No. 95-0582).
182. Complaint at 11, Bernstein (No. 95-0582).
183. 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (1996).
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In analyzing the ITAR language, one should first con-
sider which activities the regulations prohibit. Does ITAR
prohibit (a) an individual printing and distributing an Eng-
lish language analysis of a prohibited source code to friends,
(b) source code in print form, (c) source code on a floppy disk,
(d) posting source code on the Internet, (e) giving a lecture on
cryptographic algorithms at a university, or (f) merely having
a conversation at any location about how to write good crypto-
graphic source code, as long as, in (a)-(f) above, the informa-
tion reaches a foreign national?
The answer is that it is not clear how far the ITAR regu-
lations reach. Scenarios (a), (e), and (f) all appear to be pro-
hibited activities because they involve the items and/or activ-
ities of Section (1) for technical data.'8 4 Indeed, it is difficult
to imagine any kind of "information other than software"
which would not be included in this first section of the techni-
cal data definition.
This ITAR definition of "technical data" was limited by
the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Edler, 18 5 to
information "significantly and directly related to specific arti-
cles on the Munitions List."18 6 The court in Edler sought to
narrow the reach of the statute so that it would "avoid serious
interference with the interchange of scientific and technologi-
cal information."'
However, the court's attempt to save the regulations
from constitutional attack was unsuccessful. Scenario (a), for
example, would still likely be prohibited even if the analysis
in question did not contain source code, because the analysis
is "significantly and directly related to" the source code which
is specified on the USML. Additionally, it would not meet the
section 5 exclusion clause,18 8 if it could not be verified that it
was a "general scientific, mathematical or engineering" prin-
ciple which was "commonly taught." 89 Finally, from the pub-
lic domain exemption discussed below, it appears that only
scenario (e) out of this (a), (e), and (f) grouping, would clearly
qualify as information in the public domain, since it is the
184. See id. (§ 1 of the technical data definition).
185. 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
186. Id. at 521.
187. Id.
188. See (5) of definition supra and text accompanying note 183.
189. See (5) of definition supra and text accompanying note 183.
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only one connected to a university or academic conference
setting.
As for scenarios (b) and (c), the distinction between cryp-
tography in print and cryptography in source code form is a
problem of interpreting a vague or imprecise regulation. This
distinction between information in source code from the same
information in print form, is the main issue in Karn. 190
For the plaintiff in Karn, the distinction is factually in-
correct as well as constitutionally unsound.191 It is also of-
fered as evidence of arbitrary and capricious application of
the regulations by the ODTC. 192 However, the ODTC has
consistently made a distinction between "information" and
"technical data" on the one hand and "software" on the other
hand. 193 "The State Department has construed the regula-
tions in such a way as to effectively eliminate the public do-
main exemption for software per se."194 The Karn court did
not address this issue directly, dismissing the issue instead
on non-justiciability grounds. 195
Finally, Scenario (d), posting to the Internet source code
which is prohibited for export, would be a violation because,
in posting information to the Internet, it clearly would reach
not only foreign nationals within the United States, but also
foreign persons and countries outside the United States. As
such, it would clearly fall within the meaning of several of the
sections listed in the "export" definition.
196
In sum, the plain meaning of key ITAR definitions indi-
cates that the regulations are capable of restricting the dis-
semination of ideas on cryptography and communications
about cryptography. This can be shown by scenarios (a) and
(f), where an individual shares with a friend an analysis of
cryptographic source code or has a casual conversation about
cryptography. As long as this information is likely to reach a
190. Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal docketed,
No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
191. Plaintiffs Opposition at 2-5, Karn (95-01812).
192. Plaintiffs Opposition at 8, Karn (95-01812).
193. Radlo, supra note 175, at 4.
194. Id.
195. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11.
196. One practitioner notes that certain persons have made software avail-
able via FTP (file transfer protocol) over the Internet with warnings that for-
eign persons are prohibited from downloading the software. It is not known yet
whether such warnings will have any legal effect because the issue has not been
tested in court. Radlo, supra note 175, at 7.
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foreign national within the United States or finds its way
past United States national borders, ITAR would apply.
2. Incremental Amendments to the ITAR
a. ITAR Continues to Prohibit Cryptographic
Communication
The ITAR have undergone several series of amendments,
some of which appear to have been aimed at alleviating con-
stitutional problems associated with these overbroad and im-
precise definitions.19 v In 1978, 1981, and 1984, the Depart-
ment of Justice opined that the ITAR amendments proposed
by the State Department would not be sufficient to bring the
regulations out of the reach of "speech" under the First
Amendment, and might be an infringement.
198
The most recent revisions to ITAR were focused on the
"public domain" exemption.199 The early "public domain" ex-
emption was limited to unclassified technical data in pub-
lished form that was available to the public via:
(1) Sales at newsstands or bookstores;
(2) Unrestricted subscription or purchase;
(3) Second class mailing privileges granted by the U.S.
Government; or
(4) Public Libraries. 200
In 1984, the ODTC expanded this exemption to include
"information concerning general scientific, mathematical or
engineering principles," 20 1 and added Section 5 to the "techni-
cal data" definition.20 2 The revised regulations also exempt
technical data approved for release by any United States gov-
ernment agency.20 3 In 1993, ODTC further expanded the
public domain exception to include unclassified technical data
in published form that was available to the public via:
(1) Patents available at any patent office;
(2) Unlimited distribution at a public conference, meet-
ing, seminar, trade show or exhibition in the US;
197. Robinson Memo, supra note 63, at 1 n.1. and 6 n.9.
198. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
199. See Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 188-89 for a summary of the revisions
to the public domain exemption.
200. 22 C.F.R. § 75.48 (1955).
201. 22 C.F.R. § 120.21(c) (1984).
202. 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (1984).
203. 22 C.F.R. § 125.4 (b)(3) (1984).
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(3) Public release in any form after approval by the cogni-
zant U.S. government agency; and
(4) Fundamental research in science and engineering at
US colleges and universities where the resulting infor-
mation is ordinarily published and shared broadly in
the scientific community (this excludes research which
is restricted either for proprietary reasons or in con-
nection with funding by the US Government).2 °4
The problem with these revised regulations is that it is
not clear exactly what is considered to be in the public do-
main. Critics suggests that the ODTC keeps the public do-
main exemption vague so that it will have maximum flexibil-
ity in turning down commodity jurisdiction applications
containing encryption.20 5 While the ODTC's motivations are
not entirely clear, what is clear is that, despite the revisions,
the ITAR continue to restrict activity that is protected under
the First Amendment, and thus can have a chilling effect.
b. Creating Confusion and Failing to Give
Adequate Notice
In retaining a vague public domain exemption, the
ODTC's administration of ITAR may have a chilling effect on
speech because people do not know what is or is not in the
public domain, and hence will refrain from speech that is
otherwise protected. Conversely, some persons will assume
that software which is in the public domain is freely exporta-
ble, and may break the law unintentionally.
A good example of the confusion is provided by ODTC's
position on DES. The DES algorithm plainly meets the pub-
lic domain exemption. Details of the DES algorithm are
freely available from NIST publications and they have been
available since 1977.206 Publication of software programs
containing DES are available, and their export in paper form
is permitted.20 7 Yet, the ODTC does not permit the unli-
censed export of products using DES for encryption, other
than for two very limited exceptions.20 8
204. 22 C.F.R. § 120.11 (1994).
205. See Complaint, Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (No. 95-0582).
206. Testimony, supra note 45, at 482.
207. Id.
208. See supra note 101.
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The importance of this example becomes clear if one con-
siders the number of people who may regularly, without any
intention, violate the law. If one peruses the Internet
"SCI.CRYPT" newsgroup, it appears that many people with
an interest in cryptography believe that DES software is in
the public domain and thus exportable in any form.209 At
least some of these persons could act upon that belief and
post material with a DES algorithm to the Internet, or export
it in a product.
In fact, in an often cited instance of illegal export, the
government's standards agency, NIST, posted to the Internet
an item that contained source code for DES. In paper form,
the Automated Password Generation Standard that NIST
posted, FIPS 181, is acceptable for worldwide dissemination.
The FIPS, available over the Internet without an export re-
striction notice, was immediately copied by computers in
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Taiwan.2 10 When this
ITAR violation was pointed out, NIST removed it from the
directory. 211 The point is that if the government's own
agency responsible for standards dissemination can make an
error given the ambiguity of the regulations, it is likely that
many people can and do make these errors as well.
A second example is provided in Bernstein.21 2 In corre-
spondence following his initial CJ application, Bernstein
sought clarification as to whether his academic papers were
also subject to ODTC jurisdiction.213 The ODTC responded
that all the items submitted were subject to AECA and ITAR
licensing.214 After Bernstein filed his lawsuit, the ODTC sent
a letter stating that the academic paper was not subject to
the licensing requirement. 21.5 The court found it "disquieting"
that Bernstein's academic paper on the algorithm was appar-
ently subject to licensing for nearly two years and was only
reclassified after plaintiff initiated his action.216
.Although the ODTC has tried to amend the ITAR so that
it does not offend the First Amendment, its method of provid-
209. This example is taken from Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 190.
210. Testimony, supra note 45, at 482.
211. Id.
212. Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1434.
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ing very narrow exceptions to an overly broad and imprecise
regulation has not succeeded in insulating the statute and
regulations from constitutional challenges.217 ITAR still con-
tains provisions which restrict the dissemination of crypto-
graphic ideas and communications.218 It also uses imprecise
definitions that are likely to confuse persons engaged in the
distribution of cryptography, and thus does not give people
adequate notice that their actions are illegal.219
Regardless of whether the government actually applies
ITAR to restrict ideas and communications, the language of
ITAR permits such restrictions and, thus, the government at
some future date may use them for such purposes. Therefore,
ITAR leaves the export control regime open to attack on free
speech and due process grounds.
B. Protected Speech and the Appropriate Standard of
Review
Part IV.A established that the AECA and ITAR impose
restrictions on an individual's ability to disseminate cryptog-
raphy, and on an individual's ability to communicate about
cryptography abroad, and within the United States if that
speech can be received by foreign nationals. The next ques-
tion is, whether these activities are speech which warrants
protection under the First Amendment.
1. Speech or Functional Commodity?
To be protected under the First Amendment, the prohib-
ited activities must first be determined to be protected
speech. In both Karn and Bernstein, the government argued
that its enforcement of the AECA under ITAR does not regu-
late speech at all, but only conduct.22 ° It characterized the
conduct as an application for an export license, and proposed
that the material submitted is software, which has a func-
tional rather than a communicative purpose.22 1
217. See supra part IV.A.2.
218. See discussion supra part 1V.A.1.
219. See discussion supra part IV.A.2.b.
220. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defend-
ants' Motion to Dismiss at 2, Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426,
1430 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (No. 95-0582).
221. See discussion supra part IV.A.1.
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Relying on its characterization that the regulated activ-
ity in Karn and Bernstein was conduct not speech, the gov-
ernment proposed the United States v. O'Brien222 standard
to determine the constitutionality of the AECA and ITAR.
The O'Brien standard is that an incidental restriction on
speech will be permitted if (1) it is within the constitutional
power of the government, (2) it furthers an important or sub-
stantial government interest, (3) the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.223
The Bernstein court rejected the government's argument,
finding that the source code was speech for purposes of the
First Amendment.224 In addition, the court did not accept the
O'Brien test as the appropriate standard.2 25 The court noted
that the test was probably inapplicable to situations where
the activity at issue was determined to be speech not con-
duct.226 The Bernstein court also found that the government
was unconvincing on the third and fourth prongs of O'Brien
because "regulating cryptographic software appeared to re-
late to 'the suppression of free expression' and may reach far-
ther than is justifiable".227
In contrast, the Karn court "made no ruling as to
whether source codes . . . fall within the protection of the
First Amendment" 228 and stated that it would "assume that
the protection of the First Amendment extends to the source
code"229 for the purposes of deciding whether the regulation
was justified.
However, the Karn court's reasoning contradicts its as-
sumption that the source code is protected speech. The fun-
damental problem with the court's analysis in Karn is that its
acceptance and use of the O'Brien test undermines its stated
assumption. On the one hand, the court states that it as-
222. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
223. Id. at 377.
224. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436.
225. Id. at 1437.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 n.19 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal
docketed, No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
229. Id. at 9.
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sumes cryptographic source code is speech for its First
Amendment analysis. At the same time, however, it selects
the O'Brien standard, a First Amendment test which is appli-
cable to conduct, not speech cases.23 °
By utilizing this standard, the Karn court has in effect
assumed that the government is regulating conduct, which
incidentally impacts speech. The court's selection of the def-
erential O'Brien standard is consistent with other sections of
the opinion that treat the source code not as speech, but as a
functional commodity, which the court assumes Karn was at-
tempting "to export" for profit.231
2. The Appropriate Standard of Review
Establishing that the dissemination of one's crypto-
graphic source code is protected speech, however, is not the
end of the inquiry. Restrictions on speech, even prior restric-
tions, are not per se unconstitutional.23 2 The court must look
carefully at the government's rationale for the restraint to de-
cide if the licensing scheme is justified under the
circumstances.2 33
Two inquiries are relevant to deciding whether the
AECA and ITAR scheme violate the First and Fifth Amend-
ments: (1) the distinction between content-based v. content-
neutral regulations, and (2) prior restraint analysis. Examin-
ing the AECA and ITAR under Supreme Court doctrine de-
veloped in these First Amendment areas will determine the
level of scrutiny the court should apply.
a. The Content-Based v. Content-Neutral
Distinction
Whether a regulation of speech is permitted depends in
part upon whether the restriction is content-based or content-
neutral.234 Content-based restrictions regulate speech on the
basis of its general subject matter or on the basis of its partic-
230. See Harmon Memo, supra note 58, at 543 n.16; cf Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) (equating the lesser scru-
tiny standard for expressive conduct cases such as O'Brien with time, place and
manner restriction cases).
231. Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. at 2.
232. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
233. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
234. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 802
(2nd ed. 1988).
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ular viewpoint.23 5 "Content-neutral restrictions limit expres-
sion without regard to the content or communicative impact
of the message conveyed."23 6 Except for speech that the
Supreme Court has determined is of low First Amendment
value,237 content-based regulations warrant strict scrutiny
and are generally held unconstitutional.23 8
In contrast, the Supreme Court has applied a host of dif-
ferent standards to content-neutral regulations, which corre-
spond roughly to deferential, intermediate and strict scrutiny
review.239 The difficulty in sorting through the case law on
content-neutral regulations is that the Supreme Court does
not speak overtly of these three standards of review and it
has not precisely defined them.240 However, it would be in-
correct to conclude that all content-neutral regulations war-
rant deferential scrutiny.241' The Supreme Court has fre-
quently used the intermediate and strict standards for
content-neutral regulations.242
The Karn court decided that the AECA and ITAR scheme
is content-neutral and accepted the government's deferential
O'Brien standard.243 Unfortunately, the Karn opinion ar-
rived at this standard of review without any analysis of
whether the regulation is content-based 244 and without any
consideration of whether a different scrutiny standard other
than the deferential O'Brien test applied to content-neutral
regulations.245
235. See id at 803.
236. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46,
48 (1987).
237. Certain categories of speech, such as obscenity, have been determined
to be of low First Amendment value. Jill M. Ryan, Note, Freedom to Speak
Unintelligibly: The First Amendment Implications of Government-Controlled
Encryption, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165, 1189-99 (1996).
238. Id. at 1200.
239. Stone, supra note 236, at 48-54. Stone has found the Supreme Court to
articulate at least seven seemingly different standards for content-neutral re-
view. However, his analysis shows that they collapse into these three. Id. The
O'Brien test is considered a highly deferential review standard. Id. at 51.
240. Id. at 53-54.
241. See id. at 48-54
242. Stone, supra note 236, at 54.
243. Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal dock-
eted, No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
244. Id. at 9-12.
245. Id.
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The Karn opinion merely presents arguments as to why
the regulation is content neutral and then proceeds to apply
the O'Brien test. In so doing, the decision leaves the content-
based v. content-neutral analysis incomplete. In contrast, the
Bernstein court, recognizing that the parties had not had the
opportunity to brief the court on the applicable First Amend-
ment standard,2 46 specifically noted that it would make no
decision on the appropriate standard.24 7 Instead, it made the
limited ruling that source code was protected speech and that
the plaintiffs' claims were colorable even under the O'Brien
test put forth by the government.248
There is, however, a strong argument that the AECA and
ITAR scheme is a content-based regulation. Content-based
regulations extend to restrictions on public discussion of an
entire subject or topic. 249 The technical data and export defi-
nitions of the ITAR are so broad as to include the entire sub-
ject of cryptography.25 ° If the information could potentially
reach a foreign national, or if it could find its way to the In-
ternet, it requires a license.251 And, although the scheme al-
lows some communication of cryptographic information,
namely that which is in the public domain, it is not clear,
even to government officials at the ODTC and NIST, what is
in the public domain.252 Thus, the ITAR scheme requires one
to submit a CJ application and obtain a license prior to dis-
seminating any cryptography, unless the speaker can care-
fully control where the cryptography ends up.
253
246. Bernstein v. United States Dep't. of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436-37
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1437.
249. See Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(where the Court prevented a public service commission from ordering utilities
not to discuss in their monthly billing materials the desirability of nuclear
power).
250. See supra part IV.A.1 and accompanying notes. Cryptography is gener-
ally defined as the art and science of keeping messages secure.
251. For almost three years, the Department of Justice was prosecuting Phil
Zimmerman for precisely this offense. Zimmerman shared with others inter-
ested in cryptography his PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) software for encryption.
Some of these persons posted PGP to the Internet. In January of 1996, the
Department of Justice decided to drop the investigation of Phil Zimmerman.
See Radlo, supra note 175, at 7.
252. See part IV.A.2.b.
253. While it is true that persons can freely discuss, for example, their social
or political opinions on cryptography, this does not detract from the argument
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This distorts the public debate on cryptography in a con-
tent differential manner in at least two ways. First, it
removes a certain amount of public debate from the "market-
place of ideas." It will chill some cryptographic speech be-
cause some people will not want to take the chance of sharing
their cryptography with friends or with other cryptographers
on the Internet for fear that it will bring prosecution. Second,
the regulation requires the speaker to carefully examine their
cryptographic communications to decide what is and is not
subject to the regulation based on its content.254
Even if the AECA and ITAR are categorized as content-
neutral, the Court may select a higher scrutiny standard
than the deferential O'Brien standard if it feels that the regu-
lations reduce opportunities for free expression.255  The
Supreme Court has long recognized that by limiting the
availability of a particular means or mode of communication,
content-neutral restrictions can significantly impair the abil-
ity of individuals to communicate their views to one an-
other.256 In fact, the Court's pattern has been to use a strict
scrutiny standard where a restriction has a relatively severe
impact on opportunities for free expression and lesser stan-
dards where the impact is significant or modest.
2 7
"The pivotal inquiry in content-neutral analysis is the ex-
tent to which particular restrictions actually diminish the op-
portunities for free expression."121 The court will have to en-
gage in some analysis of how much speech is being curtailed
and will likely engage in a balancing between the government
and speaker's interests.2
59
that the entire subject matter or topic is prohibited. This more narrow under-
standing would conform to a content-based regulation on viewpoint.
254. One must evaluate whether the cryptography contains the DES or RSA
algorithm of sufficient key length or some other restricted algorithm to deter-
mine whether one's communication is subject to the regulation. See supra part
II.B. This situation is similar to that in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc. 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993), where an ordinance banning newsracks
distributing commercial publications from public sidewalks while allowing new-
sracks distributing newspapers was determined to be content-based.
255. See Stone, supra note 236, at 57-58.
256. Stone, supra note 236, at 57. The particular mode of communication
that the restrictions are impacting in this case is private speech in electronic
communications.
257. Id. at 57-58.
258. Id. at 77.
259. Id. at 77-78.
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The essential question for a balancing analysis is who
should bear the burden of the conflict between the speaker
and the regulation. "Should the speaker have to shift to al-
ternative means of communication or should the government
have to shift to alternative means of achieving its objec-
tives?"260 To the extent it can be shown that speakers cannot
shift because any mode of cryptographic communication that
reaches a foreign national is potentially violative, the govern-
ment regulation should be struck.
The ITAR restrictions could also be seen to pose an un-
due burden on the speaker to shift to another mode of com-
munication, thus limiting the opportunities for free expres-
sion. For example, many people interested in cryptography
use the "SCI.CRYPT" newsgroup on the Internet to communi-
cate their ideas to one another. This means of communication
is very efficient and inexpensive, allowing anyone with In-
ternet access to participate in technical discussions on cryp-
tography. It is in this forum, however, that sharing one's
cryptography is violative of ITAR regulations because posting
to the Internet "exports" the cryptography.261 If the ODTC
stringently enforced the ITAR provisions, the opportunities
for free expression for many amateur cryptographers would
be significantly curtailed.
b. Prior Restraint Analysis and Due Process
Bernstein argues that requiring a license before one can
publish ideas in a way which reaches a foreign national is a
prior restraint on speech, and therefore the government, in
order to prevent speech, must bear the heavy burden placed
on it in recent First Amendment prior restraint cases.262
Prior restraints on publication are permissible only in ex-
treme circumstances.263 The Supreme Court, in New York
Times, decided that the test is that there must be a showing
that disclosure "will surely result in direct, immediate and
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."264 In apply-
ing this test, the court will have to decide whether allowing
260. Id.
261. See note 196 and accompanying text.
262. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). This case is
also referred to as The Pentagon Papers.
263. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
264. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J. concurring).
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cryptographic communication will result in "direct, immedi-
ate and irreparable damage."265
If the court decides that the AECA and ITAR are a prior
restraint, it is unlikely that the restrictions would meet the
strict New York Times standard, or even an intermediate
scrutiny standard. The harm which can be directly attrib-
uted to the release of cryptographic information is almost
negligible. While one can postulate a very indirect connec-
tion between the ability of the NSA to carry out its signals
intelligence tasks and the release of strong cryptography into
the public domain, this indirect connection does not rise to a
heightened scrutiny standard.
c. The Effectiveness of ITAR
The effectiveness of the government's restrictions are
also a problem under a higher scrutiny standard. Many peo-
ple have pointed out that export controls cannot limit the
spread of strong cryptography to any reasonable degree, be-
cause so many persons outside the United States already
have strong cryptography.266 Since cryptography is so read-
ily available overseas, the government's interest could only
be in slowing its dissemination. All the government accom-
plishes by preventing the spread of better cryptographic tech-
niques is a small increase in the cost to other nations of using
encryption which is good enough to keep the NSA from acces-
sing their communications. Since strong cryptography is gen-
erally available abroad and relatively inexpensive,267 it is
very hard to conceive of a situation where such an effect
would rise to the standard of harm outlined in New York
Times.
d. Freedman v. Maryland: The Free Speech and
Due Process Standard
The New York Times standard of harm is not the only
hurdle under a prior restraint analysis, because of the due
process implications. "Even in those limited circumstances in
which prior restraints have been deemed constitutionally
permissible, they have been circumscribed by specific, nar-
265. Id.
266. See supra note 48 and accompanying text for how widespread strong
cryptography is worldwide.
267. See Evans, supra note 35 at 469.
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rowly drawn standards for deciding whether to prohibit dis-
closure and by substantial procedural protections."2"' The
government can require a license for speech only if there is an
important reason for licensing, and clear criteria leaving al-
most no discretion to the licensing authority. 269 Licensing
must contain procedural safeguards, such as prompt determi-
nation of requests for licenses and judicial review of license
denials.27 °
In Freedman, the Supreme Court set out the procedural
protections required to uphold a system of prior review:
(1) A valid final restraint may be imposed only upon a ju-
dicial determination;
(2) The administrator of a licensing scheme must act with
a specified brief period of time;
(3) The administrator must be required either to issue a
license or go to court to seek a restraint;
(4) Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial de-
termination on the merits must be limited to preserva-
tion of the status quo for the shortest period compati-
ble with sound judicial resolution; and,
(5) The licensing scheme must assure a prompt final judi-
cial decision reviewing any interim and possibly erro-
neous denial of a license.
271
Freedman essentially dictates that the measure of due
process required for the First Amendment is a full hearing by
a court before any prior restraint can be imposed. 2  The li-
censing decision must be subjected to a prompt judicial re-
view in a proceeding in which the government will bear the
burden of justifying its decision. 273 Thus, the burden of
bringing a judicial proceeding cannot be imposed upon those
desiring export licenses to communicate cryptographic
speech, as is currently the case under the AECA and ITAR.
The AECA export scheme fails to provide the procedural
protections given in Freedman.274 The AECA and ITAR, as
interpreted by the ODTC, do not provide this level of due pro-
268. Harmon Memo, supra note 58, at 542.
269. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-61 (1965). See also supra
note 155 and accompanying text.
270. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59-61.
271. Id. at 58-59.
272. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
274. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
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cess because there is no opportunity for appeal outside of the
administering agency. 1 Instead, the government may deny
permission as it sees fit, without any administrative or judi-
cial hearing, and without a time limit for a final decision. 6
The court should review the claims applying the Freed-
man and New York Times standards. The level of judicial
scrutiny given by this First and Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence conflicts with both the AECA's statutory preclusion of
judicial review and non-justiciability on political question
grounds.
C. Judicial Review
The cryptography First Amendment cases differ from the
more mainstream First Amendment line of cases in a very
important way. The courts must contend with arguments
that the claims are not reviewable because of statutory
preclusions in the export laws and because the claims con-
cern a political question, and are thus not within the federal
courts' subject matter jurisdiction.2"7
1. The Statutory Exemption
The AECA contains a specific provision for a limited ex-
emption from judicial review, which reads as follows:
Judicial review of designation of items as defense articles
or services.
The designation by the President (or by an official to
whom the President's functions under subsection (a) of
this section have been duly delegated), in regulations is-
sued under this section, of items as defense articles or de-
fense services for purposes of this section shall not be sub-
ject to judicial review. 278
275. See discussion supra part II.B.3.c.
276. See notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
277. On the government's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6), a court will usually hear the political question issue prior to
addressing the case on the merits. A claim may "arise under the Constitution"
by presenting constitutional questions yet still be non-justiciable. In this case,
the court would invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack ofjurisdic-
tion over subject matter. See PAUL BREST AND SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKUNG: CASES AND MATERIALS 1466 (1992).
278. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h) (1988).
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Thus, any court hearing First and Fifth Amendment chal-
lenges to the AECA must consider to what extent this statu-
tory language precludes consideration of the claims.
a. Constitutional Claims
There is a strong presumption under administrative law
that Congress intends judicial review of administrative ac-
tion.2 79 Subject to constitutional constraints, Congress can
make exceptions to the historic practice whereby courts re-
view agency action.2 0 The presumption of judicial review is,
after all, a presumption, and "like all presumptions used in
interpreting statutes, may be overcome by," inter alia, "spe-
cific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable
indicator of congressional intent to preclude judicial review
that is fairly discernible" in the detail of the legislative
scheme. 28 1 Where substantial doubt about the congressional
intent exists, the general presumption favoring judicial re-
view of administrative action is controlling.
2 2
Unfortunately, almost no legislative history is available
for the §2778(h) exemption that was passed as an amend-
ment to the AECA in 1989.283 The Congressional intent un-
derlying the passage of this amendment is vague, at best.
Furthermore, the legislative history and case law on the
reach of the §2778(h) exemption provides even less clarity.
Both Karn and Bernstein ruled that the AECA statutory ex-
emption does not preclude constitutional claims.28 4
Where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of
constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear...
[This] heightened showing [is required] in part to avoid
the "serious constitutional question" that would arise if a
federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum
for a colorable constitutional claim.285
279. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
280. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 673
(1986) (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984)).
281. Id.
282. Block, 467 U.S. at 350-51.
283. AECA 1989 Amendment Subsection (a)(2), Pub. L. No. 101-222, §3(a).
284. Karn v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1996), appeal docketed,
No. 96-5121 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996); Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp
1426, 1432 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
285. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 37198
19961 EXPORT CONTROLS ON ENCRYPTION 199
b. Administrative Claims
However, the Karn and Bernstein courts took very differ-
ent approaches on the justiciability of administrative or
"abuse" claims. The Karn court viewed the plaintiffs APA
and ultra vires claims as a challenge to the ODTC's CJ deci-
sion that the material on the disk was not in the public do-
main.286 As such, the court held the §2778(h) exemption
barred the claim because this statutory exemption extends to
all decisions regarding the CJ procedure.28 v The court distin-
guished Karn's challenge of the CJ decision from a "facial
challenge" to the statute, which raises "a discrete issue, unre-
lated to the facts of the case, that only needs to be resolved
once."
288
In contrast, the Bernstein court argued that in addition
to constitutional claims, ultra vires or "abuse" claims were
also outside the statutory preclusion.28 9 Unlike the Karn
court, Bernstein did not dismiss plaintiffs APA or adminis-
trative claims.290
In finding all challenges to the CJ procedures subject to
the judicial review preclusion, the Karn court has construed
the §2778(h) preclusion broadly to restrict all types of claims
which can be brought under §2778(h), except those based
upon strictly facial constitutional challenges. Yet, there is no
case law supporting this narrow reading of the effect of the
2778(h) statutory preclusion or any of the statutory preclu-
sions under the export control laws. Moreover, the Bernstein
court demonstrated that case law exists to establish that
such claims are not subject to the statutory preclusions in the
export control laws.291
2. The Political Question Doctrine
The courts have been reluctant to hear the First and
Fifth Amendment challenges against AECA and ITAR be-
cause of the political question doctrine. However, there are
286. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 5-8.
287. Id. at 6.
288. Id. at 8.
289. Bernstein v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1431 n.7 (N.D. Cal.
1996). The Bernstein court cited U.S. v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 917 (1993) in support of its interpretation. Id.
290. Id. at 1437.
291. See supra note 289.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
several arguments in support of judicial review, even though
the claims relate to national security concerns.
It is well established under the political question doc-
trine that courts do not possess the expertise to examine sen-
sitive political questions reserved for the elected branches of
government.292 The government argued in Karn and Bern-
stein that the determination of whether an item should be on
the USML "possesses nearly every trait that the Supreme
Court has enumerated traditionally renders a question 'polit-
ical'."293 The Bernstein court, however, argued that a review
of a CJ determination was "distinctly different" from a con-
stitutional challenge and "the judicial branch not only pos-
sesses the requisite expertise to adjudicate these issues, it is
also the best and final interpreter of them."
294
"The doctrine is one of 'political questions' not one of
'political cases'."295 The court should not reject a bona fide
controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political'
exceeds constitutional authority.2 96 Federal courts have con-
sistently addressed constitutional issues in the context of na-
297tional security concerns.
The limited statutory exemption from judicial review
provided by AECA 2778(h) and the political question doctrine
must be considered against the plaintiffs' right to free speech
and due process prior to being denied life, liberty, or property.
Even if the government interest in regulating the flow of
cryptographic information is significant enough to warrant
some form of prior restraint, the government should provide
prompt, expedited judicial review before imposing the re-
straint, as established in Freedman.
The rulings of courts that have shown judicial restraint
in deciding First and Fifth Amendment cases against the
AECA have not adequately settled the issue. The Edler
court, for example, attempted to resolve the constitutional
difficulties in the ITAR regulations by narrowing the scope of
292. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
293. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1431 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 904
F.2d 601, 602 (11th Cir. 1990)).
294. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1431.
295. Nuclear Pacific, Inc. v. United States, No. 84-49R, slip op. at 7 (W.D.
Wash. June 8, 1984) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
296. See id.
297. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1431 (citing New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) and Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)).
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the technical data provisions. It made this attempt by re-
stricting the regulations to information "that relate[s] in a
significant fashion to some item on the Munitions List."298
However, as discussed, this attempt did not put any mean-
ingful limits on the definitions. 29
9
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Two events occurring in December of 1996 altered the
landscape of encryption export controls and require addi-
tional analysis.3 0 0 The first is that the Bernstein court de-
clared Category XIII(b) of the ITAR unconstitutional as a
prior restraint on speech.3 0 1 The second is that on December
30, 1996, the Clinton Administration transferred export juris-
diction over non-military encryption from the USML to the
CCL, amending the EAR. 2  Although these two recent de-
velopments are only the latest in the continuing political
struggle over encryption, they will substantially impact
lawmakers and administrators charged with the task of
resolving these issues.
A. Bernstein Declares the AECA/ITAR Scheme as Applied
to Cryptography Unconstitutional
Although not a surprising result under the analysis in
Part IV, the Bernstein court's decision, released December 18,
1996, was headline news. 03 In sharp distinction to the Karn
decision, the Bernstein court ruled that Category XIII(b) was
"directed very specifically at applied scientific research and
speech on the topic of encryption",3 0 4 and thus could be con-
sidered a content-based regulation.3 0 5 The fact that the
298. United States v. Edler, 579 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1978).
299. See discussion supra part 1V.A.1.
300. The above analysis in Parts II-IV was current as of November 1996.
This Recent Developments section is provided to illuminate changes occurring
in December of 1996 and to discuss how these events modify the analysis of
Parts II-lV.
301. Bernstein v. United States, No. C-95-0582, 1996 WL 730283, at *10,
(N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 1996).
302. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 50 Fed. Reg. 68,572 (1996) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pts. 732,734,740,742,744,748,750,762,768,772,774).
303. See, e.g., Tom Abate, Victory for Secrecy Software, S.F. EXAMINER, De-
cember 19, 1996, at Al.
304. Bernstein v. United States, No. C-95-0582, 1996 WL 730283, at *8,
(N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 1996).
305. See id at 6-10.
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scheme regulates encryption in the interest of national secur-
ity did not alone justify a prior restraint for the court, which
relied heavily on New York Times.
0 6
More importantly, however, the court found that the
AECA and ITAR licensing scheme was an unconstitutional
prior restraint because it did not meet the Freedman proce-
dural standards in failing to provide: (1) a time limit on the
licensing decision, (2) prompt judicial review, and (3) a duty
on the part of the ODTC to go to court and defend a denial of
a license. 0 7
Although the Bernstein court voided sections of the pub-
lic domain exemption as applied to technical data,308 it took a
rather conservative approach in striking the other ITAR defi-
nitions. The court declared Category XIII(b) unconstitutional
and the technical data definition unenforceable, but only as it
relates to items in Category XIII(b), in order to extend its in-
validation of the statute no "further than is necessary to dis-
pose of the case before it." 30 9 While the court found certain
ITAR provisions failed to give people "a reasonable opportu-
nity to know what was prohibited,"310 and uncertainty in
what acts can actually be prosecuted under the ITAR, it did
not find the "export" definition "impermissibly vague."311
B. Jurisdictional Shift from the USML to the CCL
Responding to software industry pressure for encryption
export control reform, and possibly in anticipation of an unfa-
vorable Bernstein decision, the government put into effect
regulations shifting export control from the State Depart-
ment's ODTC to the Commerce Department' BXA.31 2 Execu-
tive Order 13026 "amends the EAR by imposing national se-
curity and foreign policy controls ("EI" for Encryption Items)
on certain information security systems and equipment, cryp-
tographic devices, software and components specifically
306. Id. at 8.
307. Id. at 10.
308. Id. at 14.
309. Bernstein, i996 WL 730283, at *10-15.
310. Id. at 14.
311. Id.
312. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
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designed or modified therefor, including recoverable encryp-
tion software, and related technology ("encryption items")". 13
Essentially, the amendments add new El controls under
Export Commodity Control Numbers (ECCN) 5A002, 5D002
and 5E002 for "commodities, software and technology".
3 14
While the most recent changes to the ITAR required licensing
of 40 bit or greater encryption, 1 5 the new amendments to the
EAR subject encryption to five different categories of
'licensing:
(1) Certain mass market encryption software after a one
time BXA review may be released from controls;
(2) Recovery encryption software and commodities may
be eligible for a license exception after a one time BXA
review;
(3) Non-recovery EI's up to 56 bits DES or the equivalent
requires a general licenses after a one time BXA re-
view if the exporter agrees to build and market a "key-
recovery escrow" system that would allow the govern-
ment access to encrypted data;
316
(4) All other encryption will be subjected to an "encryp-
tion licensing arrangement" which is intended to con-
tinue without change the regulatory treatment of the
ITAR; and
(5) Encryption technology exports which will be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis.
317
These amendments, particularly the new provisions for
56 bit encryption for a period of two years, were an imple-
mentation of a compromise between the software industry
and the Clinton Administration. 8 In exchange for a com-
mitment by the industry to develop key escrow-which places
the key in escrow with a trusted, government approved third
313. 50 Fed. Reg. 68,572-73 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts.
732,734,740,742,744,748,750,762,768,772,774).
314. Id.
315. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
316. The applicant has two years to develop such a system within which time
the applicant must submit detailed business and marketing plans every six
months in order for the license to be renewed. For a good discussion of the
Clinton Administration's attempt to control industrial policy with these provi-
sions see A. Michael Froomkin, It Came from Planet Clipper: The Battle Over
Cryptographic Key "Escrow" U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 1997).
317. 50 Fed. Reg. 68,572,68,573-75.
318. Rory J. O'Connor, Pact Allows Encryption for Export, S.J. MERCURY
NEWS, Nov. 16, 1996 at Al.
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party, who could provide access to government law enforce-
ment agencies-the government agreed to ease export con-
trols.319 Instead, the new regulations have been viewed by
software industry representatives and civil libertarian
groups as "a government shell game".320 They insist that the
new export rules are virtually identical to the AECA/ITAR
scheme. 21
C. The Jurisdictional Shift Does Not Resolve the
Constitutional Issues
The regulatory shift by the Clinton Administration fails
to resolve the constitutional issues posed by Bernstein and
Karn.322 The new regulations continue to violate the First
Amendment because they are content-based and fail to pro-
vide the procedural safeguards required by Freedman.
The Bernstein court considered Category XIII(b) of ITAR
a content-based restriction because it was specifically di-
rected at speech on a particular subject matter--cryptogra-
phy.323 The court also relied on Supreme Court doctrine that
First Amendment protection extends not only to viewpoint
prohibitions but also to prohibitions on public discussion of
an entire topic. 324 Like Category XIII(b), the Clinton Admin-
istration's amendments to the EAR specifically target cryp-
tography and also sweep into EAR control cryptographic
speech on this entire topic. 325 As a result, the new regulatory
regime violates the First Amendment, just as Category
XIII(b) of the ITAR does.
The Bernstein court found the AECA and ITAR licensing
scheme to be unconstitutional as a "paradigm of standardless
discretion" because it failed three important criteria set out
in Freedman: provisions for time limits, prompt judicial re-
319. See Janet Rai-Dupree, Encryption Idea Falls Flat, S.J. MERCURY NEWS,
July 13, 1996, at C2.
320. Encryption Export Rules Draw Fire from Industry, THE RECORDER, Dec.
31, 1996 at 3.
321. Id.
322. In addition, the new policy introduces a number of new statutory issues
in its attempt to dictate industrial policy, which are beyond the scope of this
comment. See Froomkin, supra note 316 (showing that this industrial policy is
beyond the statutory authority granted under the IEEPA).
323. Bernstein v. United States, No. C-95-0582, 1996 WL 730283, at *10,
(N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 1996).
324. Id. at 8.
325. See supra notes 313-21 and accompanying text.
204 [Vol. 37
19961 EXPORT CONTROLS ON ENCRYPTION
view, and a duty on the part of the agency to go to court to
defend its licensing decision.326 Similarly, the new regula-
tions under the EAA/EAR fail to comply with Freedman.
Although the EAR does provide time periods for a licensing
decision, it contains no time limit for an appeal. 327 There is
no provision for prompt judicial review of decisions because
the EAA contains an explicit exemption from judicial review
of agency decisions as does the EAR. 32 8 And, of course, with
this explicit preclusion of judicial review, the EAA/EAR does
not specify a duty on the part of the agency to go to court to
defend license denials.
The EAA/EAR licensing scheme prior to the Administra-
tion's December 1996 amendments did provide certain for-
eign availability review procedures, which may have been
sufficient to keep that regulatory regime in constitutional
conformance. 329 However, the Administration included spe-
cific language in its Executive Order 13026 amendments to
ensure that the amended EAR would not provide these proce-
dural opportunities.3 3 ° In its Executive Order 13026 amend-
ments, which pertain only to encryption items, the Adminis-
tration has effectively continued the licensing regime under
the AECA and ITAR, extending unconstitutional provisions
on judicial review to the EAA and EAR scheme.
D. Statutory Authority Under the IEEPA's Extention
of the EAA
Further complicating the current regulatory status of en-
cryption is the status of the EAA itself. Statutory authority
for the EAA, which is essentially a temporary statute, ex-
pired in August 1994.331 As presidents before him have done
326. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
327. 15 C.F.R. § 756.2(c)(1) provides only that the appeal decision be made
within a "reasonable time".
328. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(a); 15 C.F.R. 756.2(c)(2).
329. Although no cases prior to Bernstein and Karn specifically addressed
cryptography and the First Amendment under the EAA and EAR, there are
cases which have upheld the EAA/EAR's exemption from judicial review.
United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Helmy, 712 F. Supp. 1423, 1428-29 (E.D.Cal. 1989). While the reasoning in
these cases relied primarily on political question grounds, the EAA's review
procedures for foreign availability weighed heavily in the analysis. See, e.g.
Helmy, 12 F. Supp. at 1433.
330. 50 Fed. Reg. 68,572,68,575.
331. Exec. Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437(1994).
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upon the lapse of statutory authority for the EAA, President
Clinton declared a national emergency and issued Executive
Order 12924 "in light of the expiration of the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1979" and in view of the "unusual and ex-
traordinary threat to national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States."3 32
Executive Order 12924 rests on the authority vested in
the President by "the Constitution and laws of the United
States of America, including but not limited to section 203 of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702)"(IEEPA)3 M The problem with this temporary
extension of the EAA is that it is not clear what substantive
authority the IEEPA gives to the President to control
encryption.
Although Section 1702, defining Presidential authority
under the IEEPA, gives sweeping powers to the President
over financial transactions and property, the statutory con-
struction of this section and specific language limiting presi-
dential authority over the flow of information indicates that
the IEEPA was not intended to allow the regulation of
encryption. 34
Throughout the section granting authority, the statute
refers to "transactions"3 35 and "transfers or payments"3 36 or
"property"33 7 as the objects of regulation. More specifically,
Section 1702(b) states that:
[tihe authority granted to the President by this section
does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, di-
rectly or indirectly (1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic,
or other personal communication, which does not involve
a transfer of anything of value; . . . (3) the importation
from any country, or the exportation to any country,
whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or
medium of transmission, of any information or informa-
332. Id. At least one commentator has suggested that the "unusual and ex-
traordinary threat" seems to be Congress's failure to renew the EAA. Froom-
kin, supra note 316 (showing that this industrial policy is beyond the statutory
authority granted under the IEEPA).
333. Exec. Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437(1994).
34. See generally, 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1994).
335. 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(A)(i)
336. 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(A)(ii).
337. 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(B).
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tional materials, including but not limited to,
publications ... 3s
The section prohibiting control over the free flow of informa-
tion goes on to provide an exception for exports "otherwise
controlled" by the EAA and national security controls.339
In sum, the IEEPA does not give the President any new
statutory authority to control encryption exports. In addi-
tion, the structure and language of the IEEPA indicates that
the IEEPA does not authorize the President to prohibit the
exportation of publications. This is precisely the administra-
tive activity challenged in the Bernstein litigation which the
federal court ruled unconstitutional. The President should
not be allowed to grant himself, by executive order under the
IEEPA, emergency statutory authority for administrative ac-
tion which a federal court has already determined to be an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. If an administra-
tive action is unconstitutional under a statute, it is also un-
constitutional under a Presidential executive order.
The Administration's uncertain statutory authority
under the IEEPA will likely spawn even more litigation by
plaintiffs such as Karn and Bernstein, challenging the statu-
tory authority of the Commerce Department to administer
export controls on encryption under the EAA/IEEPA and
EAR regulatory scheme. Unlike the AECA/ITAR, the EAA/
IEEPA scheme is clearly subject to judicial review.340 The
IEEPA may even allow challenges to the EAA/EAR scheme
that would not be judicially reviewable if statutory authority
currently existed for the EAA.341
338. 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1) and (3).
339. The section reads "otherwise controlled for export under section 2404 of
the Appendix to this title, or under section 2405 of the Appendix to this title to
the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or antiterrorism pol-
icies of the United States, or with respect to which acts are prohibited by chap-
ter 37 of Title 18". Id.
340. Nuclear Pac., Inc. v. Department of Commerce, No. C84-49R slip op.
(W.D. Wash. June 8, 1984) (holding that the IEEPA extension of the EAA per-
mits judicial review).
341. Id. at 5. The court held that the IEEPA did not grant the President the
power to limit the jurisdiction of the courts. Id. Thus, President Clinton's Ex-
ecutive Order 13026 EAR amendment denying judicial review exceeds the au-
thority granted by Congress under the IEEPA. Because there is no statutory
authority to deny judicial review under the IEEPA and no statutory authority
to deny judicial review under the EAA because it is a lapsed statute, then there
are currently no statutory limitations on the judicial reviewability of claims
brought against the EAA/IEEPA and EAR scheme. I
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Unless Congress acts, further litigation can be ex-
pected,342 with courts potentially striking offending language
in the AECA/ITAR or EAA/EAR schemes in order to bring
them into constitutional conformance. The result will likely
be a regulatory nightmare for both exporters and regulators
alike.
VI. PROPOSAL
A. Legislative Reform of Export Control
The Administration has preempted, for the moment at
any rate, the Bernstein and Karn litigation currently before
the federal courts by removing encryption from AECA and
ITAR jurisdiction.4a The shift in jurisdiction, however, has
failed to provide a workable solution for the software industry
and to solve the constitutional problems raised by recent liti-
gation because most of the licensing features of the AECA
and ITAR have been continued in the EAA/IEEPA and EAR
scheme.344
Some observers feel that it is up to Congress to make the
next move in this political struggle.345 Software industry rep-
resentatives have stated publicly that "[their] members agree
that [they] should go back to Capitol Hill" for a resolution. a6
Congress can respond in at least two ways: (1) by passing
legislation to renew the EAA and giving the Administration
new statutory authority for its EAR amendments; or (2) by
enacting entirely new legislation specifically written to effect
encryption export control reform. This author recommends
that Congress take the latter course and pass legislation spe-
cifically providing for export control over encryption which
meets the First Amendment strict scrutiny standard of New
York Times and the procedural requirements of Freedman.34 7
342. Bernstein has already announced that he will ask the federal court to
declare the new EAA/IEEPA and EAR regulations facially unconstitutional.
Electronic Frontier Foundation Press Release (visited Jan. 2, 1996) <httpJ/
www.eff.orglbernstein/961230.pressrel>.
343. See supra part V.B.
344. See supra part V.C.
345. Editorial, Now its Up To Congress to Unlock Encryption, S.J. MERCURY
NEWS, Jan. 6, 1997, at B6.
346. Alex Lash, Industry Fights Crypto Rules, C/NET (visited Dec. 31, 1996)
<http'J/www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,6560,00.html>.
347. See discussion supra part IV.B.
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Legislation for encryption control reform was submitted
in Congress's last session, and is likely to be submitted again
in the 105th Congress.348 If Congress fails to enact reform,
the existing ITAR or EAR schemes will continue to operate as
a prior restraint on cryptographic speech, and the constitu-
tional problems will remain. 49 In such a case, the courts will
be forced to re-examine the constitutional issues in light of
the recent developments.
B. Further Judicial Action to Bring Export Controls Into
Constitutional Conformance
If Congress fails to enact encryption export control re-
form legislation, then the court's will be faced with more liti-
gation on these constitutional issues. As of this writing, such
challenges will be directed at the EAA/IEEPA and EAR
scheme. Claims will be directed at the AECA and ITAR
scheme if export controls on encryption are returned to the
USML, as President Clinton has threatened to do if Congress
enacts export legislation which the Administration deems
inadequate.35 °
In either case, further judicial action may be necessary to
ensure that export controls on encryption are held to the
First Amendment strict scrutiny standards. Two federal dis-
trict courts have come to opposite conclusions on the constitu-
tionality of export controls, based on AECA and ITAR juris-
diction, leaving the status of the scheme in question.
351
In the future, courts hearing these cases should continue
to strike offending sections of the export controls to bring the
regulations in line with constitutional protections on free
speech and due process. As the Bernstein decision has
demonstrated, it is not necessary for the courts to strike
either the statute or the regulations in their entirety. Courts
hearing ITAR challenges should, however, go one step farther
than the Bernstein court.352 In addition to striking Category
XIII(b), they should strike the three definitions in the ITAR
that are unconstitutional on their face: The export, technical
348. See supra note 7.
349. See supra parts IV.B, V.C.
350. Memorandum on Encryption Export Policy, 1996 WL 662442 (White
House) (Nov. 15, 1996).
351. See discussion supra part V.B.
352. See discussion supra part V.A.
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data, and public domain exemption sections.35 3 The ODTC
should be required to narrow the scope of these three defini-
tions so that they do not apply to the types of situations ana-
lyzed in scenarios (a) through (f).354
By far the most important element missing in both the
AECA/ITAR and EAA/IEEPA and EAR schemes from both a
prior restraint and a due process analysis, is a clear provision
for a judicial determination before a final restraint is im-
posed.3 55 The judicial exemptions should be interpreted nar-
rowly so that constitutional and administrative "abuse"
claims can be heard.35 6 The court should also interpret the
statute to provide for full, expedited judicial review which
meets the Freedman standard.35 7
VII. CONCLUSION
The legislative and regulatory stalemate over govern-
ment encryption policy has essentially left to the federal
courts the task of resolving First and Fifth Amendment
claims against export controls on encryption. Although the
judiciary is not the best forum for legislative and regulatory
reform, courts are uniquely equipped to decide constitutional
questions.
Because source code is speech and because the export
controls are both content-based regulations and prior re-
straints on speech, federal courts hearing the First and Fifth
Amendment claims should use a strict scrutiny standard and
review cases under the more stringent Freedman and New
York Times tests. Substantial revisions to the export control
laws are required. Thus, Congress should pass comprehen-
sive reform legislation, rather than attempt to renew statu-
tory authority, in piecemeal fashion, with temporary statutes
such as the EAA.
The political question doctrine poses an obstacle for court
challenges. However, the courts should not shy away from
353. See discussion supra part WV.A.
354. The scenarios were (a) an individual distributing an English language
analysis of cryptography, (b) source code in print form, (c) source code on floppy
disk, (d) posting source code to the Internet, (e) giving a lecture on cryptography
and (f) having a conversation about cryptography which reaches a foreign na-
tional. See discussion supra part V.A.1.
355. See discussion supra parts IV.B.2.d, V.B-C.
356. See discussion supra part 1V.C.I.b.
357. See discussion supra part 1V.C.
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resolving constitutional questions because they relate to for-
eign policy and national security. The courts should be will-
ing to decide these cases on the merits, as they present novel
issues on constitutional rights, which should not be over-
whelmed by national security concerns.
Laura M. Pilkington

